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Context-dependent cheating:  
Experimental evidence from 16 countries 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their 
institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across 
countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across sixteen countries with 1440 participants. 
We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine 
chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to 
cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of 
institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens' honesty for our sample countries. 
Keywords: Honesty, corruption, cultural differences 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Imagine yourself on a university campus. You see the following announcement: “Is this your lucky day? 
Flip a coin and win a Chocolate”. You approach the desk and receive the opportunity to win a delicious 
and beautifully wrapped Lindt Lindor chocolate truffle by flipping a coin with a black and a white side. 
You flip the coin in a box at a nearby table; the box protects your anonymity. You win a chocolate if you 
report that the white side came up and nothing if you report black. If you actually rolled black, the only 
thing keeping you from enjoying the truffle is your moral compass. You face a tradeoff between the joy 
of eating a fine chocolate and the individual disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of 
lying. There is no social shaming or ostracism. We ran this experiment (three treatments) in sixteen 
countries to test how some regular citizens around the world behave in such a situation. Interestingly, we 
did not find any significant differences across an otherwise very heterogeneous set of countries. 
 Most studies about cultural differences regarding dishonest behavior have used the survey 
methodology. Transparency International reports large differences in corruption around the world and the 
World Value Survey documents cross-cultural differences in opinions regarding how “justifiable” it is to 
cheat on taxes or public transportation fares. However, corruption indices measure perceptions and not 
actual behaviors. Further, variations across countries in academic dishonesty (Rawwas, Al-Kahtib and 
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Vitell, 2004) and tax evasion (Alm, Sanchez and de Juan, 1995; Cumming, Martinez, McKee and Torgler, 
2009) reinforce the impression that cheating is both abundant and diverse around the world. In the same 
line, recent research in behavioral and experimental economics has shown that a large fraction of 
individuals are prone to cheating (Ariely, 2012; Gneezy, 2005). An exception to this trend is Abeler et al. 
(2014) who report a phone-based incentivized experiment with a representative sample in Germany. They 
find that most people report honestly after flipping a coin in absolute privacy with a 50% chance of 
getting a payoff of 15 euros in cash or through an Amazon gift certificate. Abeler and colleagues also 
complemented their study with a laboratory experiment and find that there is a slightly higher level of 
dishonest reporting in this setting. 
 The dominant view in the literature is that individuals engage in dishonest behavior as long as 
they can maintain a positive self-image while obtaining the maximum payoffs from their dishonesty 
(Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008). Further, research has shown that creating a justification of a positive 
self-image while behaving dishonestly is context specific (Fosgaard, Hansen and Piovesan, 2013; Gino 
and Galinsky, 2012; Pascual-Ezama, Prelec and Dunfield, 2013).   
In this paper, we examine precisely this. That is, whether cheating per se differs across different 
countries and whether the context1 influences this behavior. We conducted an experiment in which 
participants reported the outcome of a coin toss to win a prize. We replicated the experiment in a diverse 
set of 16 countries around the world with 1440 subjects, 90 in each country (30 per treatment). We used a 
simple cheating task based on Bucciol and Piovesan (2011). We took great care to run each session under 
similar conditions. The location of the experiment was always a busy common areas on university 
campuses (See Table 1 for an overview). Participants had to flip a black/white coin; if the outcome was 
reported white, they obtained a red Lindt Lindor Truffle; if reported black, they obtained nothing. As our 
sample includes substantial cultural variation—including participants from Anglo-Saxon, Latin, 
Germanic, Nordic and Asiatic countries—one would expect substantial heterogeneity in cheating. In 
addition, and consistent with a social constructionist view, the effects of culture depend on the specifics of 
the choice context (Gelfand, 2013; Kramer and Messick, 1995). 
In the first treatment (the Self-Reported Treatment, SRT) each participant flipped a coin in a 
private area without the presence of the researchers or other participants. Afterwards the subject filled a 
report sheet – indicating sex and the white/black coin-toss result. It was clearly indicated that the filled 
form should be left in the box nearby. No interaction with the experimenters occurred in this task. 
Taking into account that there are heterogenous types of dishonest people (Gneezy, Rockenbach 
and Serra-García, 2013), this task is a good measure of dishonesty for several reasons. Firstly, as a 
growing body of research suggests that in completely anonymous settings, where the risk of being caught 
                                                          
1 The context defines the strength of the moral compass in our experiment. 
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is inexistent, finding 100% cheating is not unusual (Pascual-Ezama, Prelec and Dunfield, 2013; Shu, 
Mazar, Gino, Ariely and Bazerman, 2012), however, people may also restrict the amount of cheating 
(Ayal and Gino, 2011; Gneezy, 2005).  
In our task there is no possibility to restrict the amount of cheating, the decision is simply to be 
honest or not (report black or white). Further, decision making is immediate and intuitive, instead of 
deliberative and meditative in a cognitive dual system (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011; Kahneman, 
2011). In our experiment, cheating is an automatic response and the need for justification matters only 
when people have enough time to deliberate (Shalvi, Eldar and Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Finally, the reward 
is a simple chocolate that gives instant gratification.  
The two other treatments were the Written and the Verbal Reported Treatments (WRT and VRT, 
respectively). In WRT, participants completed a report sheet in private and submitted it to the 
experimenter. The experimenter made a note of the reported outcome, and, if due, handed the chocolate to 
the participant. In VRT, participants were not asked to fill any form. They verbally reported the outcome 
of the coin flip to the experimenter. If reported white, the experimentalist handed a chocolate to them. 
Our different treatments allow us to understand how the level of cheating is shaped by context, 
i.e. the differences in reporting across treatments. Building on the theory of self-image maintenance 
(Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008), we predict that our three treatments will have different implications with 
regard to the moral processes of reporting incorrect outcomes. We conjecture that misreporting in the 
SRT is the least morally difficult decision since reporting does not involve any kind of social interaction 
and, subsequently, no social pressure from the experimenter. Consequently, the decision to be dishonest is 
only a tradeoff between the internal moral pressure (and the consequent guilt experienced) against the 
pleasure of enjoying a Lindt chocolate.  
In WRT, an additional moral pressure originates from the fact that the decision is documented on 
paper and handed to another person. This additional social process is likely to involve shame (on top of 
guilt) in case of dishonesty, and hence we expect less dishonesty occurring in this treatment. Relative to 
verbal reports, we conjecture that written reports are more distant and make it easier to take away internal 
moral control (Shu et al. 2012). Therefore, we expect the VRT to bring even stronger self-image erosion 
in case of cheating, since the untruthful decision now must be stated face-to-face. In this situation we 
expect the most moral pressure to be present and hence the least dishonest behavior. This is consistent 
with Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara and Pastorelli (1996) who find that verbal reports are likely to be less 
prone to dishonest behavior than written reports. Given this we hypothesize that self-reporting with no 
interaction (with the experimenter) increase the temptation to be dishonest. 
  
 
6 
 
Table 1. Summary of countries studied. 
Country City University 
Austria Linz  Johannes Kepler University Linz  
Belgium Brussels  Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)  
Colombia Bogotá  Universidad de los Andes  
Denmark Copenhagen  Copenhagen University  
Finland Oulu  University of Oulu  
Germany Nuremberg  University of Erlangen-Nuremberg  
Greece Rethymno   University of Crete  
India Delhi  Hansraj College, University of Delhi  
Indonesia Salatiga  Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana  
Italy Padova  Università di Padova  
Japan Tokyo  Waseda University  
Netherlands Utrecht  Utrecht University  
Spain Madrid  Universidad Autónoma Madrid  
Turkey Istanbul  Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi  
USA Baltimore  Johns Hopkins University  
UK London  Middlesex University  
 
2. Experimental design 
We replicate a simple coin task by Bucciol and Piovesan (2011). As noted before, participants had to flip 
a black/white coin. If the reported toss was white they obtained a red Lindt Lindor chocolate and nothing 
otherwise. 
At first glance, the choice of chocolate as an incentive might seem as unusual compared to the 
conventional choice of money. We believe that chocolates are a good solution for studying decision-
making across countries, given that our study is in a field setting and not in the laboratory. In fact, we 
believe that it is advantageous to tell students you have a chance of winning a chocolate, rather than 
telling them you have a chance to win a dollar (or any corresponding local currency). Consuming a small 
snack in such a situation is simply much more of an everyday event, and hence feels more natural. And a 
more natural setting enables greater experimenter control and external validity. Furthermore, a chocolate 
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is a chocolate anywhere, and subjects never have to calculate the monetary value of the good, just receive 
a small delicious snack. Clearly, there are many other potential incentive approaches one could apply. A 
monetary prize could be scaled based on Big Mac prizes, GDP, or any purchasing power index. Although 
there might be country differences in chocolate preference (as indicated by Messerli, 2012), the choice of 
chocolate as payment constitutes just as many or just as few concerns as any other cross-country payment 
vehicle, including country-adjusted monetary compensations. Another possible concern is the very small 
size of the incentive. We acknowledge the small size, yet we want to emphasize that considering the 
extremely short duration of the experiment (perhaps 1 or 2 minutes), our payment translates into an 
hourly payment similar to what is used in most laboratory studies. 
Our participants are university students2. The coin was flipped only once and by one person at a 
time. The task was performed in a private area at a safe distance from the experimenters or other 
participants. The location of the experiment was within the college/university campus, for example, in a 
hallway in the cafeteria area, hence ensuring a steady flow of potential participants. To ensure that we do 
study country differences, we ensured that only native people participated in the various locations. The 
importance of ensuring this is supported by evidence of the effect of immigrants’ original country social 
norms in ethical behavior (Kountoris and Remoundou, 2013). The experiment was carried out in the local 
working language for both the verbal and the written part.3 
The whole study comprises three different treatments according to the level of proximity between 
the participant and the experimenter: 
• Self-Reported Treatment (SRT): A student approached the experimenter (at table A, see 
Figure A1 in the appendix for details), he/she was handed a report sheet, and was guided to 
table B (far enough away from the researcher area) to flip the black/white coin privately (see 
B in Figure A1). The coin flip was carried out inside a small cardboard box to make it truly 
private. The student noted gender and the result of the coin flip on the report sheet at table 
B. After filling out the report sheet, the student walked over to a third table (table C in 
another private area at a distance from the experimenter, see C in Figure A1) to deposit the 
report sheet in a box, and to take the chocolate him/herself in case of a white toss. 
• Written Reported Treatment (WRT): Exactly the same as SRT, but now with the filled out 
report sheet in hand, the student went back to table A, gave the report sheet to the 
                                                          
2 Recent papers show that typical experimental subjects are not really different from ordinary people (see for 
instance Exadaktylos, Espin and Branas-Garza, 2013 for social dilemmas.) 
3 A few students asked why the coin-chocolate event was carried out. Our prepared explanation was that the purpose 
was to understand the students’ interest for chocolates. This statement was intentionally made imprecise, such that 
students did not think this was a test but rather saw it as a chocolate promotion (we never said it was a Lindt 
promotion). 
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experimenter and received the chocolate if a white toss was reported. Table C is therefore 
not used (see figure A1, appendix).  
• Verbal Reported Treatment (VRT): Exactly the same as WRT, but now the student did not 
have to fill out the report sheet (only report gender) and had to inform the experimenter 
verbally about the outcome of the coin toss.  
We ran the experiment with 90 participants in each country. There were 10 students for each 
treatment and this was repeated three times: 10 (WRT), 10 (VRT), 10 (SRT), 10 (WRT), 10 (VRT), 10 
(SRT), 10 (WRT), 10 (VRT), 10 (SRT). We started each treatment with ten chocolates on a plate on table 
B (VRT and WRT) or table C (SRT). When we changed the treatment we refilled the chocolates taken by 
the participants and registered the exact number of chocolates replaced4. At the beginning of each 
treatment we started with ten chocolates in the plate. At the end of the experiment we compared the 
numbers in our records with the reports by the participants. In WRT and SRT participants wrote the color 
on the report sheet. In VRT participants only wrote the gender. In this case, when participants gave us the 
report sheet and told us the color we tore a little corner of the report sheet when they told us black so at 
the end we could know how many blacks and whites were declared. 
Note that, as we kept no names or individual-specific records, we had to be very careful about 
whether someone returned. Experimenters were instructed to inform anyone who tried to return to flip the 
coin again that it was only possible to participate once. In case, faculty members showed up for 
participation, it was emphasized that it was intended to be a student event. Completing the experiment 
took about a minute or two. 
3. Results 
3.a. Differences by treatments 
To our great surprise, overall only 57% of the participants reported white across all three treatments and 
countries. Since the probability of obtaining white is 50%, this result indicates that 86% resisted the 
temptation to lie [100% - 2(57%-50%)]. We conclude that little dishonesty is observed across all 
countries and treatments. Looking at the different treatments, the degree of dishonest behavior, listed as 
the percentage of white outcomes, confirms our initial conjectures. We observe a greater amount of lying 
in the SRT, with WRT in the middle, and with VRT having the smallest amount of lying. 
 
62% (SelfRT) > 57% (WrittenRT) >53% (VerbalRT) 
 
                                                          
4 Note that having more or less chocolates on the plates is not an issue for participants as they never get to know the 
total. What they see (on the plate) is the only reference they have. 
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The differences between SRT and WRT are not statistically significant (χ2=.316; p-value=.574), although 
the average across the sixteen societies were 5 percentage points higher for the former. However, using a 
contingency table (Pearson χ2) the difference between SRT and VRT was larger (9 percentage points) and 
significant at the 5% level (χ2=4.479; p-value=0.034). Further, we do not find any significant differences 
between WRT and VRT (χ2=2.422; p-value=0.120). Thus, comparing the different treatments we find 
that the verbal reports are likely to be less prone to dishonest behavior than written reports in line with 
previous literature (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara and Pastorelli, 1996; Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; 
Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008) and we further find that self-reporting the answers (and not having to 
deliver it to the experimenter) increases this effect. 
 
3.b. Differences by countries 
A second important result is that we find no statistically significant differences across the 16 countries 
across any treatment: SRT (χ2 = 16.953; p-value=0.322); VRT (χ2 = 15.691; p-value=0.403) and WRT 
(χ2 = 22.674; p-value=0.091). This suggests that there is a high level of homogeneity in behavior across 
our sample countries.  
Additional interesting results show up from a closer examination of the data. Since tossing a coin 
follows a binomial distribution, we looked for those countries where there is an anomalous number of 
white (awarded) coins reported. Table 2 reports detailed information by country and treatments5. At the 
country level, the share of whites reported in excess of 50% (across all treatments), is significant (at a 5% 
significance level) in three out of sixteen countries. Yet, the overall country level effects can mask 
underlying effects at the treatment level. We therefore focus on the treatment effects at the country level. 
Obviously a sample size of 30 per treatment allows us only to make rough assessment of the degree of 
cheating, but we still believe this rough measure provides a useful comparison across countries and 
treatments6.    
      
                                                          
5 We have also conducted a Logit analysis to explain the outcome of individual coin tosses. In the regression, among 
other factors, we controlled for different income levels across countries (with the help of per-capita GNI) and for 
country-level per-capita cocoa consumption. While income does not seem to have a significant impact, per-capita 
cocoa consumption has a negative effect on cheating, i.e. the higher the per-capita consumption the lower is 
cheating. 
6 We also conduct the analysis by using Inglehart-Welzel cultural categories (based on the World Value Surveys). 
Again we do not find any robust effect of culture on cheating behavior. 
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Table 2. Results by condition and country. 
 
  
Country 
Self-Report (SRT)  
(n=30 p/t) 
Written Reported (WRT) 
(n=30 p/t) 
Verbal Reported (VRT) 
(n=30 p/t) 
All 
(n=90) 
Austria 40%   77% *** 60%  59% * 
Belgium 57%  47%  53%  52%  
Colombia 57%  67% ** 43%  56%  
Denmark 70% ** 43%  40%  51%  
Finland 63% * 67% ** 53%  61% ** 
Germany 73% *** 50%  53%  59% * 
Greece 60%  60%  37%  52%  
India 47%  67% ** 50%  54%  
Indonesia 60%  57%  40%  52%  
Italy 60%  47%  57%  54%  
Japan 57%  60%  57%  58% * 
Netherlands 67% ** 60%  50%  59% * 
Spain 77% *** 67% ** 63% * 69% *** 
Turkey 53%  67% ** 57%  59% * 
USA 70% ** 53%  63% * 62% ** 
UK 63% * 33%  70% ** 56%  
Notes: Columns show the percentages of participants who have taken chocolates in each treatment (denoted “p/t”);  
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; *** p-value<0.01. 
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Result from the Self-report treatment (SRT) is displayed in Figure 1. In SRT we find that the null 
hypothesis of honest behavior is rejected for a number of countries. This figure shows that UK and 
Finland reject the null at α=10% (dotted line labeled with *). Most importantly, Germany and Spain 
reject at α=1% (continuous line labeled with ***). Finally, Netherlands, Denmark and the US reject 
for 1%<α<10%. 
 
Fig. 1. Percentage of chocolates taken in the SRT. 
  
 
* p-value<0.10; *** p-value<0.01. 
 
Figure 2 displays data from Table 2 for the written and the verbal treatments. Blue (left side) bars 
in Figure 2 refer to WRT (written). The number of countries that reject the null is reduced to six and they 
are not the same as in SRT: Colombia, Finland, Turkey and India reject at 1%<α<10% while Austria 
does so at α=1%. Spain weakly rejects (α=10%). Data from VRT (verbal) are shown in the red bars 
(right side) of Figure 2. Only two countries appear significant: Spain rejects at 1%<α<10% while the UK 
rejects at the 1% level. The US weakly rejects (α=10%) 
There are some interesting issues to emphasize: Spain also rejected the null in all treatments. 
Unexpectedly UK appears under the verbal and the self-reported treatment but not in the written. The 
latter case is exactly the complementary of Austria which appears in the written case only. Also the US 
and Finland appear in two treatments. It is also important to remark that Belgium, Greece, Italy, Indonesia 
and Japan never appear as dishonest.7 Although it is interesting to note that these difference at the 
condition level do not aim at explaining each country-specific effects, we simply want to highlight that 
                                                          
7 It is also interesting the case of Denmark. Significant differences for SRT vs. WRT (χ2 = 4.344; p-value=0.037) 
and VRT (χ2= 5.445; p-value=0.020) are found.  
***
*
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besides our overall conclusion of no significant across-country effects, we do observe some variation in 
the data.  
Fig. 2. Percentage of chocolates taken in the WRT and VRT. 
 
* p-value<0.10; *** p-value<0.01.  
 
3.c. Gender differences 
On an exploratory basis, we also analyzed the effect of gender (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for 
a review). Although previous studies have found correlations between gender and cheating (e.g. Dreber 
and Johannesson 2008, Fosgaard et al. 2013), no statistically significant differences between the countries 
were found for the male (χ2= 15.898; p-value=0.389) or for female (χ2= 10.679; p-value=0.775) 
participants in line with very recent studies (Abeler, Becker and Falk, 2014). Analyzing by treatment, no 
differences were found in the SRT [(χ2= 16.374; p-value=0.358) (χ2= 17.051; p-value=0.316)], WRT 
[(χ2= 19.872; p-value=0.177) (χ2= 19.341; p-value=0.199)] or the VRT [(χ2= 8.581; p-value=0.898) 
(χ2= 12.618; p-value=0.632)] treatments. Clearly, studying gender further reduces data size and our lack 
of results could be due to this. Our results indicate that that males and females do not behave differently 
in our sample. 
 
3.d. Comparison with other evidence of unethical behavior 
Austria
Belgium
Colombia
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Greece
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Turkey
UK
USA
written
oral
***
*
***
*
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The analysis of our result can be complemented with a comparison of the (published) rankings of 
corruption. Note that the link between cheating and corruption has been reported as strong (Magnus, 
Polterovich, Danilov and Savvateev, 2002). Therefore, we have tested whether our experimental data 
correlate with any of the following international corruption indexes from Transparency International and 
WJR Rule of Law Index: i.e. the BSI 2011: Bribery Paying Index (from Transparency International); the 
PCI 2012: Perception of corruption Index; the GCB 2013: Global Corruption Barometer (average of all 
sectors) and AOC2014: Absence of corruption8. Table 3 summarizes all the correlations (twelve 
comparisons: 4 indices x 3 treatments), for the countries in our sample that are also represented in the 
indices. 
Table 3. Pearson correlations of the three index with the three treatments. 
 BSI 2011 
(11 countries) 
PCI 2012 
(16 countries) 
GCB 2013 
(14 countries) 
AOC 2014 
(16 countries) 
SRT 0.057 -0.334 -0.590** -0.096 
p-value 0.868 0.205 0.026 0.725 
WRT 0.232 0.317 0.340 0.115 
p-value 0.492 0.231 0.235 0.673 
VRT -0.483 -0.381 -0.339 -0.336 
p-value 0.132 0.146 0.236 0.203 
Notes: (.) indicates the number of countries in the sample. Some countries of our sample are missing in the 
BSI (Austria, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Greece) and in the GCB (Austria, Netherlands); p-value is 2-
tailed; ** p-value<0.05. 
 
As shown in Table 3, only one correlation is statistically significant (GCB2013 vs. SRT; p<0.05). 
On top of that, the sign of the correlations do not follow any pattern: we get 7 negatives and 5 positives. 
We can safely say that international indices indicative of institutional honesty are not correlated with our 
experimental data.  
As a further robustness check we also analyzed the relation between the behavior in the 
experiments and answers to the world value surveys questions about morality attitude9. We find that 
neither the answer of individual item (all p>0.100) nor the average (p=0.179) of them is correlated with 
our experimental evidence. 
                                                          
8 Note that, countries were ordered from least to most corrupt for all indices for the analysis. 
9 Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties; Justifiable: Claiming government benefits to 
which you are not entitled; Justifiable: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance; Justifiable: Avoiding a fare on public 
transport; Justifiable: Stealing property. 
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4. Conclusions 
Why people cheat and how it varies across cultures is an important policy question. Most of the 
studies regarding this have focused on institutional dishonesty (or corruption). However, whether 
institutional honesty directly maps into its citizens (innate) honesty has not been explored. Note that, 
while institutional honesty is a function of its (self) rules, individual honesty is much more primal, and 
hence different from its more popular counterpart, i.e. institutional honesty. Interestingly, there is little 
work in this regard. This papers attempts to study citizen´s honesty in a multi-country study. To our 
knowledge this is the first study of this kind due to the span of countries and the incentivized mechanism 
used. 
Most studies on institutional honesty rely on non-incentivized self-reported surveys. In our study, 
we use chocolates as an incentive and temptation device. The reward is announced and is the main 
motivator to prospective participants in our experiment. They hope to win a chocolate by taking part in 
the experiment. This self selection also implies that they have a preference for the reward and have fallen 
for the “temptation of winning a chocolate.” By using this mechanism we thus study the innate tendency 
to lie amongst citizens of sixteen countries.  
Our main finding is that there are no statistically significant differences across our sample countries 
regarding their honesty levels. In fact we observe a high level of honesty and some important culture-
specific interactions. Recall that in our task we compare honest behavior across countries when subjects 
can report the outcome under three conditions, i.e. Self, Written or Verbal. We argue that these three 
conditions differ in terms of the moral weight of lying. That is, under Self reporting and no interaction 
with the experimenter, the moral weight of lying is the least, meanwhile, it increases as we move from the 
Verbal to the Written condition. 
Overall, we do find support for our initial hypothesis in that there is greater deception under the Self 
reporting condition followed by Written and Verbal. However, we observe no differences across 
countries. Our lack of results in this regard could be due to the smaller data size at the treatment level in 
each country. We have additionally looked whether we observe significant differences across countries by 
grouping the according to common characteristics (i.e. European, Asian etc.). Again we find no 
significant differences across our sample countries. Finally, though handicapped by even smaller number 
of observations, we do not find any gender differences across the three conditions or countries. 
As mentioned earlier we measure the innate tendency of citizens to cheat and would like to stress 
that this is very different from studying institutional honesty. Our results should not be confounded with 
those studying institutional honesty as the factors that determine one are different from the other. Further, 
the kind of cheating we study is instinctive. That is, subjects do not get time to deliberate their actions. 
15 
 
The same applies to their participation in the experiment. That is, we explicitly state the reward and hence 
expect that we attract participants that have an affinity towards chocolate consumption. Given this, the 
high levels of honesty we observe across countries is indeed surprising. Further, our results show that 
apparently this is true across our sample countries. 
We look at the side of citizens and not at the supply side of corruption in the private and public 
sector of the economy. Survey studies suffer from empirical issues such as confounding factors and 
hypothetical biases that are inherent in questionnaires (Falk and Heckman, 2009). Further, reliable data on 
issues such as corruption, dishonesty, cheating, etc. are hard to come by. It is in this context that the 
experimental methodology is very useful. We tested ordinary citizens’ behavior, as opposed to subjective 
perceptions of national institutions. Importantly, however, our data suggest that ordinary citizens are 
much more honest than implied by surveys focused on national institutions. Perhaps it is the corrupting 
nature of these institutions that is reflected in these survey studies, but not the corruption of the average 
citizen. The lack of connection between the supply of corruption and the honesty of individual citizens 
also requires further inquiry. Our results suggest that the variation in honesty across countries is not 
correlated with corruption indices, opening questions about the accountability of private and public 
institutions and the poor connection with the citizens’ behavior and preferences for honesty in their 
private decision. Our results clearly show the need for further incentivized and controlled experiments to 
explore the issue of ordinary citizens´ honesty across countries. 
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Appendix: Details on experimental design 
 
We used a poster with the following text:  
“Is this your lucky day? Flip a coin and win a Chocolate”. 
 
When the participants arrived, the researchers gave a report sheet to them with different text (depending 
on the treatment). Every participant in the three different treatments marked the gender in the report sheet 
(that was important because in the SRT treatment researchers cannot recorder the gender). Instructions 
were the following:  
• Non Reported Treatment: “If you want to win a chocolate, go to table B and flip a coin inside the 
box. Then mark on the paper the color you had, black or white, and your gender. Go to the table 
C, and deposit the paper in the box. If you mark white you can take a chocolate, if you mark 
black you just leave”. 
• Written Reported Treatment: “If you want to win a chocolate, go to table B and flip a coin inside 
the box. Then mark on the paper the color you had, black or white, and your gender. Come back 
and give us the paper. If you mark white we will give you a chocolate, if you mark black, 
nothing” 
• Verbal Reported Treatment: “If you want to win a chocolate, go to table B and flip a coin inside 
the box. Then mark on the paper your gender, come back, and tell us the color you had. If it was 
white we will give you a chocolate, if it is black, nothing” 
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Figure A1. Procedure and tables’ distribution. Block A: WRT and VRT tables’ distribution. We used 
a table (Table A) with a Poster (where the researchers were) in a visible situation for students (for 
example in hallway in the cafeteria area). With a couple of meters of distance in another table (Table B) 
there was a box with a black/white coin inside where the participants flipped the coin (inside the box) 
without nobody could see them. Block B: SRT tables’ distribution. In SRT there was another table (Table 
C) with was a small box where the participants gave the report sheet and took the chocolates. Block C: 
Picture example in Spain. Although the experiment rules are written in the reports the researchers provide 
to the participants at the beginning of the task, all researchers are native in order to avoid 
misunderstandings in the communication. 
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